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ABSTRACT: The term ‘inertia’ is often used to describe a kind of irrational resistance to change 
in individuals or institutions. Institutions, ideas and power structures appear to become 
entrenched over time, and may become ineffective or obsolete, even if they once played a 
legitimate or useful role. In this paper I argue that there is a common set of problems 
underlying the occurrence of resistance to change in individuals, social structures and the 
development of knowledge. Resistance to change is not always irrational or problematic; it is 
also necessary to allow stable personal identities and social structures to survive in a constantly 
changing world. I offer a historical and theoretical framework for the question of inertia. 
Finally, I argue that philosophy has often seen its task to be the critique of ossified, inert or 
obsolete ideas and social structures, but that it has neglected the positive dimension of 
resistance to change. 
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INERTIA AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
In a scene from the popular TV-series Breaking Bad, chemistry teacher-turned-meth 
cook Walter White and his partner in crime Jesse Pinkman discuss the old recreational 
vehicle which they had been using as a mobile drugs lab. Why, with all the money they 
were making, did they hang on to this dangerously decrepit old vehicle? 
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Jesse: ‘Why’d we keep it? Why did we have to have the world’s shittiest RV?’ 
Walt: ‘Inertia?’ 
Jesse: ‘Yeah... inertia.’1 
This exchange points to a common experience, something which most of us will have 
occasion to observe in ourselves or in others: Why do things refuse to change, even 
when the need for change seems obvious and indisputable? Why are people sometimes 
unable to change, even when they might desperately want to? 
When used in a social, political or psychological context, the term inertia is often 
used to describe a kind of irrational or counterproductive resistance to a change which 
is considered to be necessary, desirable or unavoidable. According to Freud, there is 
an ‘inertia inherent in organic life’: the human organism is inherently conservative and 
will only change when forced by external circumstances.2 This kind of inertia, 
however, is not limited to the individual or psychological level. It is even more 
common to speak of the inertia of governments, of bureaucratic organizations or even 
of whole societies. For example, in a recent ‘Manifesto for Europe’ published in the 
Guardian, French economist Thomas Piketty criticizes the inertia of EU institutions.3 In 
literature and public discourse, government, laws and institutions sometimes become 
almost synonymous with bureaucracy, and bureaucracy is immediately identified with 
inefficiency, lack of flexibility and an inability to adapt to new developments. Like 
individuals, institutions and other social structures seem to be inherently inert: instead 
of smoothly and gradually adapting to changing environmental, technological or social 
circumstances institutions long outlast their usefulness, only to suddenly crumble under 
their own dead weight. 
The concept of inertia is used in everyday language to talk about resistance to 
change in individuals as well as in political and social structures, and in academic 
discourse it is applied, in one way or another, in fields as diverse as sociology, 
psychology, organizational studies, economics, political theory and philosophy. But in 
all these fields this concept is often used rather vaguely, without a clear theoretical 
grasp of what is implied in it, or how its use in different contexts and academic 
disciplines is related. In fact, as soon as we start to work out what we mean by inertia, 
it turns out we run into all sorts of theoretical difficulties. ‘Inertia’ and ‘resistance to 
change’ are sometimes used interchangeably. More often, inertia is used in a negative 
1 ‘Gliding Over All’, Breaking Bad, Season 5, Episode 8. Directed by Michelle MacLaren, produced by 
Vince Gilligan. AMC, 2 September 2012. 
2 Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in Peter Gay (ed.), The Freud Reader, London, WW 
Norton & Co, 1989, pp. 612-613. 
3 Thomas Piketty, ‘Our Manifesto for Europe’, The Guardian, February 5, 2014, 
 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/02/manifesto-europe-radical-financial-
democratic. 
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way, to mean a ‘bad’ kind of resistance to a desirable or necessary change, while 
resistance to change can also be neutral or even positive. But how do we distinguish 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ changes, and good and bad kinds of resistance? What 
determines whether a change (whether it is on an individual, institutional or political 
level) is rational or desirable? And what, or who, determines what forms of resistance 
are appropriate, legitimate or justifiable in specific instances? The use of the concept of 
inertia immediately raises such normative questions, and use of the more neutral 
‘resistance to change’ only obscures this unavoidable normativity. 
To make this a little more concrete: when Piketty claims that the institutions of the 
European Union are inert, what does this mean? Obviously, it means that he thinks 
change is desirable, necessary and possible, and that the EU fails to institute those 
changes which he thinks are desirable. But what if an EU official comes up and says, 
‘Look, Mr. Piketty, you may think the changes you propose are a good idea, but 
they’re really not, for reasons x, y and z?’ Or: ‘Yes, that does seem like a good idea, 
but unfortunately under the current circumstances it is impossible?’ It seems that, in 
many cases, inertia is merely in the eye of the beholder: whether we think a particular 
agent or institution is irrational in resisting change depends on whether we think 
change is rational or desirable. The irrational resistance of the one is the reasonable 
caution of the other; how, failing a clear standard of rationality, are we to judge which 
one is right?  
This also points to another problem. It is clear that resistance to change can also 
be a good thing: an individual or an institution can’t constantly adapt to all changes in 
the environment or to every passing fancy. A reasonable level of institutional inertia 
provides the necessary stability, continuity and legitimacy which allows institutions and 
society to function.4 At the same time, it also seems that there are cases where 
institutions do become obsolete and resist change against better reason. If we deny 
this, then we would have to admit that all courses of action, all individually held beliefs 
or institutional arrangements are reasonable or legitimate for precisely as long as they 
persist in being, and their passing away is the only sure sign of their being wrong. But, 
given that resistance to change can be necessary as well as irrational, how do we 
distinguish between the two? When does legitimate resistance to change become 
irrational inertia?  
One problem with the concept of inertia is that it is used in different ways in 
different academic disciplines and in different contexts. Another problem is that its 
meaning is unclear: does inertia mean things merely persist in being as they are, or 
4 Michael Hannan and John Freeman, ‘Structural Inertia and Organizational Change’, American 
Sociological Review, vol. 49, no. 2, 1984, pp. 149–64. 
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does it mean they actively resist change? In this paper I will begin to address these 
problems by offering a unified account of inertia in the development of individuals, 
social structures and in the development of knowledge. Firstly, I will briefly describe 
what is usually meant by inertia on these three levels. Secondly, I will explain why the 
concepts of inertia and resistance to change are especially important for the way we 
think about ourselves and about society. I will do this by arguing that, since the 
beginning of the modern age, there has been a fundamental shift in the way we think 
about the world: we no longer think about reality in terms of a fixed, natural order, 
but rather in terms of processes of generation and decay. For this reason, the notion of 
resistance to change plays an important role in explaining the stability of social 
structures as well as the persistence of personal identity. Finally, I will argue that 
philosophers have often seen resistance to change or inertia as problematic, and have 
cast themselves in a ‘therapeutic’ role: they seek to overcome illegitimately fixed or 
ossified ideas or social structures by showing that these structures are objectifications of 
a more complex, more dynamic underlying reality. However, the dominance of this 
‘critical’ tendency in philosophy has neglected the positive aspect of resistance to 
change and social stability and has led to a one-sided appreciation of the phenomenon 
of inertia. 
WHAT IS INERTIA? 
The term ‘inertia’ is used primarily to refer to the physical phenomenon first described 
by Kepler, Galileo and Newton: the tendency for a body to persist in a state of motion 
or rest unless there are forces acting upon it. It is also used to talk about resistance to 
change in individuals or society, however. In this case, it is used in quite a different 
sense: physical bodies do not resist change, they merely persist in motion in the 
absence of forces; when people talk about the inertia of an institution, however, they 
usually mean things stay the same when there are, in fact, forces working towards 
change. When applied to society the notion of inertia has a normative content which is 
absent in the physical context. Saying a person, an institution or a society in general is 
inert is to make a value judgement: it implies the claim that it, or they, could, and 
should be different. When talking about social inertia people do not give an objective 
analysis of a situation; rather, they talk about what is possible and desirable. 
The notion of inertia or resistance to change has come up in many academic 
disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, psychology, political theory, economics 
and organizational studies, but it has not really been examined in a systematic way.5 In 
5 For an overview of research on inertia and resistance to change in economics, organisational studies, 
cognitive psychology and political theory see Roberta Patalano, ‘Resistance to Change: Historical 
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the following I will distinguish between three kinds of inertia: inertia in individuals, 
inertia in social and political structures, and inertia in the development of knowledge 
and concepts. These three levels are often examined in isolation in the relevant 
academic disciplines. I will argue, however, that they are meaningfully connected, and 
that a general theory of inertia and social change would provide a common framework 
from within which questions about, for example, psychological or social inertia could 
be better understood.  
On the level of inertia in individuals, the example from Breaking Bad is a case in 
point. People become ‘stuck in their ways’: they hold on to their beliefs and ways of 
thinking against countervailing evidence, and they continue to act as they have always 
done even when other ways of acting have become possible and sometimes more 
appropriate. In more extreme cases psychological resistance becomes the object of 
psychoanalysis or other forms of psychotherapeutic treatment, which try to change 
irrational or destructive behaviours and beliefs. Hegel links inertia to anxiety: people 
resist change because they are more familiar with the status quo, and change leads to 
uncertainty and fear.6 The causes of and reasons for resistance to change in individuals 
are multiple, however. People are creatures of habit: they learn and internalize 
behaviours, which can then be applied repeatedly, even when changed circumstances 
have made a different response more appropriate. But habits are not just sources of 
inertia; they are also a necessary element in learning-processes and the formation of 
skills.7 Another reason for inertia in individuals lies at the border between the 
individual and the social: people can be unable to change because they feel they have 
to conform to a social role; they depend on publicly available concepts and norms 
Excursus and Contemporary Interpretations’, Review of Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 2, 2011, pp. 249–66. 
Stephen Jay Gould writes about ‘stasis’ and what he calls ‘punctuated’ development in evolutionary 
theory (The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2002). Connie 
Gersick applies Gould’s notion of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ to resistance to change and revolutions on six 
levels: individuals, groups, organizations, science, biology and physics (‘Revolutionary Change Theories: 
A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm’, Academy of Management Review, vol. 16, 
no. 1, 1991, pp. 10–36). 
6 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p. 51. 
7 This dual aspect of habit has a long tradition in the philosophical literature. As Hegel writes, ‘while on 
the one hand man is freed by habit, he is also enslaved by it.’ (Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, J.M. Petry 
(ed.), vol. 2, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1979, p. 401). See also Felix Ravaisson, Of Habit, Bloomsbury, 2009 and 
Clare Carlisle, On Habit, Routledge, 2014. As Bourdieu argues with his notion of ‘habitus’, habit in this 
sense should not be seen as purely a matter of individual learning, but as the confluence of individual 
action and routine social practices. For Bourdieu, too, habitus is necessary to give structure and substance 
to social life, but at the same time can cause dogmatic beliefs and social distinctions to be reproduced 
without being questioned. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Stanford University Press, 1992. 
                                                                                                                                                         
 BART ZANTVOORT 347 
which the individual alone is unable to change; or they are subject to what 
psychologists call ‘groupthink’: the tendency of people in groups to suppress dissenting 
opinions and ignore evidence which goes against shared assumptions.8 
With regards to the inertia of social and political structures, countless examples 
could be given. Institutions, laws and ideas are developed at a certain moment in time, 
and in response to specific circumstances and social problems. Because institutions 
have a tendency to isolate themselves from their environment and to perpetuate 
themselves under changed conditions they can also become obsolete, and continue to 
function according to an outdated logic when the reason for their existence has long 
disappeared. Francis Fukuyama calls this form of institutional inertia political decay: 
‘The conservatism of societies with regards to rules is … a source of political decay. 
Rules or institutions created in response to one set of environmental circumstances 
become dysfunctional under later conditions, but they cannot be changed due to 
people’s heavy emotional investments in them.’9 And, just as inertia in individuals can 
be a result of social factors, social inertia is also influenced by individuals in many 
ways. One example is the desire for security and stability, and the anxiety engendered 
by change. As Machiavelli puts it: 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or 
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new 
order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done 
well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well 
under the new.10 
Finally, the question of inertia in the development of knowledge, concepts and 
ideas can also be approached in many ways. The history of ideas is a complicated 
amalgam of everyday language and common sense, religious beliefs, political 
ideologies, philosophical systems, as well as technological and scientific knowledge. 
The notion that systems of knowledge can become obsolete, that ways of thinking can 
continue to exist and assert themselves against better evidence is commonplace. 
Francis Bacon already formulated the effect of what would now be called ‘cognitive 
bias’: 
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion … draws all 
things else to support and agree with. And though there be a greater number and 
weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and 
despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this 
8 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Boston, Cengage Learning, 
1982. 
9 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, New York, 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, p. 44. 
10 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Simon & Brown, 2011, pp. 47–48. 
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great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusions 
may remain inviolate.11 
Again, conceptual inertia clearly influences and depends on the behaviour of 
individuals, and it is also connected with social and political factors in many ways. A 
program of systematic research into this phenomenon would have to take into account 
the many complex interactions between these various levels. The most famous 
investigation into resistance to change in the development of scientific knowledge is 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Kuhn argues that scientific progress 
is not continuous and gradual, but that scientist adhere to ‘paradigms’ which lead 
them to overlook, ignore or even unconsciously repress countervailing evidence, until 
the body of evidence contradicting the paradigm has grown so overwhelming that a 
revolution occurs, leading to a new paradigm which manages to integrate more of the 
evidence.12 
So far, I have only given a rough sketch of the various issues involved in thinking 
about inertia in individuals, society and the development of knowledge. One thing that 
all these examples have in common is that, despite the generally negative connotation 
of the term inertia, resistance to change in all these cases has a positive as well as a 
negative side, and these two aspects are deeply connected. In individuals, habit can 
lead people to get stuck in outdated, ineffective or even self-destructive ways of 
thinking and acting, but in normal circumstances it also allows them to repeatedly and 
efficiently perform complicated sequences of actions. Similarly, in institutions a certain 
amount of institutional inertia is necessary to provide them with the stability and 
legitimacy they need to function effectively.13 Resistance to change can become a 
problem when change seems desirable or necessary, but it also lends stability and 
predictability to individual and social life. In the rest of this paper, I will argue that this 
double character of resistance to change is a necessary result of the way we experience 
the world, which is bound up with the transformation of our world-view in the modern 
age.  
CHANGE, REST AND RESISTANCE 
The nature of inertia and resistance to change in individuals and in society can only be 
understood, I will argue, in light of a fundamental shift in the way we view change and 
stability in the natural and social world which took place in the second half of the last 
millennium.  
11 Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, Prentice Hall, 1960, p. 50. 
12 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
13 Hannan and Freeman, ‘Structural Inertia and Organizational Change’; P. Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review, vol. 94, 2000, pp. 251–67. 
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The opposition of change and rest has marked the Western philosophical tradition 
from its beginning. As Alain Badiou explains it in The Subject of Change, we can speak of 
two basic hypotheses with regards to the ultimate nature of reality, one represented by 
Parmenides and the other by Heraclitus.14 Parmenides famously claimed that all is one 
and eternal: since it is impossible for what is to pass over into non-being, or for what is 
not to come to be, all change is an illusion. Heraclitus, by contrast, held that 
everything always changes. Socrates recounts Heraclitus’ position in Plato’s Cratylus as 
follows: ‘All things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream 
of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.’15 According to 
Badiou the subsequent history of philosophy, starting from Plato and Aristotle, can be 
represented as a series of attempts to reconcile this basic opposition. From this point of 
view, the fundamental aim of philosophy has been to explain how stability and change, 
identity and difference can coexist. 
The Aristotelian worldview, which held sway throughout the middle ages, and 
continued to exert a strong influence into the early modern period, still privileged 
stability or rest over change and motion. According to Aristotle, change was the result 
of the alteration of the accidental properties of enduring substances, and all material 
entities on the earth tended towards their natural place of rest. Since rest was primary, 
change and motion were things that needed to be explained. Aristotle famously had 
difficulties explaining why propelled objects continue to move after they have left the 
hand or the sling which gave them their motion: since there is no longer anything 
directly exerting a force upon them, why do they not immediately come to a halt?16 
From the sixteenth century onwards, however, a number of revolutions in science, 
politics and philosophy started to call into question this primacy of rest over change. 
First, the Copernican revolution dispelled the earth from its stable resting place at the 
centre of the universe. The development of physics, chemistry, biology and geology 
brought to light that everything, from physical elements, to living beings, to our planet, 
is subjected to processes of change, decay and constant transformation. Solid objects 
turned out to be hives of activity at a microscopic or sub-atomic level, and eventually 
even time and space turned out to be relative. In politics, a series of political and social 
revolutions – from the Dutch revolt against the Spanish Crown in 1572, to the Glorious 
Revolution in England, to the American and French Revolutions – threw the 
14 Alain Badiou, The Subject of Change, New York, Atropos Press, 2013, pp. 32–39. 
15 Plato, Cratylus, 402a. In Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, vol. 3, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1892, p. 62. 
16 Aristotle, Physics, David Bostock (ed.), trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
p. 229. 
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established social order into disarray.17 In philosophy, the critique of received religion 
and traditional authority undermined the belief in eternal essences, god-given social 
hierarchies and an immutable natural order. The elevation of critical reason over 
dogmatic faith culminated in the Enlightenment and Kant’s critique of dogmatism. 
Eventually, reason itself seems to have fallen prey to its own critical tendencies, leading 
to its auto-deconstruction in the second half of the twentieth century. As I will explain 
in more detail further down, these developments led to a gradual inversion of the 
relation between rest and change: today, it seems reasonable to say that change has 
become primary, and rest and stability are now in need of explanation. 
From the nineteenth century onwards order and stability came to be seen as being 
fleetingly imposed on a reality which is itself in constant flux. This primacy of change 
is perhaps best expressed in Nietzsche’s famous statement that reality is ‘in all eternity 
chaos,’18 or in Lord Kelvin’s first formulation of the second law of thermodynamics: 
‘The existence in nature of a universal tendency towards the degradation of mechanical 
energy.’19 The question which now faces us is this: if everything is always changing, 
and if everything is subject to an inevitable process of loss of energy and decay, what 
becomes of stability and identity? How do we explain the stability and persistence, not 
just of personal identity, institutions, social structures and laws, but of physical objects 
and natural laws? To put it again in Nietzsche’s words, how do we explain the 
existence of ‘complex structures, relatively enduring, of life in the midst of 
becoming?’20 
Under the Aristotelian worldview, rest is in no need of explanation: things are the 
way they are because it is in their nature to be so, and it is only when things depart 
from their natural state of rest that we need to find a reason to explain this movement. 
Conversely, under a modern worldview, it is rest, stability and identity which need to 
be explained. What are the forces which hold together the particles in the nuclei of 
atoms? How do complex systems emerge in a world characterized by increasing 
entropy? How do states maintain themselves in existence against forces of internal 
17 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, New York, Penguin Books, 2006. Arendt stresses the importance of the 
American and French revolutions in transforming our understanding of history and the political realm. 
However, many crucial developments, such as the idea that sovereignty can reside with a political body 
constituted by popular consent rather than with a monarch, or the notion of abstract freedom as opposed 
to particular liberties, can be traced back at least as far as the formation of the Dutch Republic. See 
Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1998. 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage, 1974, p. 168. 
19 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, London, Heinemann, 1984, p. 115. 
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1968, p. 380 (translation 
altered). 
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dissent and external opposition? How do people cope with a constantly (and, as 
Hartmut Rosa claims, ever more rapidly)21 changing social and technological 
environment? When change becomes normal or ‘natural’, stability becomes the 
exception; and resistance to change becomes a necessary prerequisite for the 
maintaining of identity. 
This view of change and stability has important consequences for the way we think 
about inertia. At first glance, individual, social or political inertia seem like bad or 
undesirable things. It quickly becomes clear, however, that some forms of resistance to 
change are necessary: because societies and individuals have to deal with constant 
changes in the social, technological and natural environment, processes of resistance to 
change or active self-maintenance are needed to provide stability and to ensure the 
enduring existence of social, organic and material structures. But how do we 
distinguish between necessary self-maintenance or justified instances of resistance to 
change on the one hand, and irrational, illegitimate or unnecessary forms of resistance 
to change on the other? If we admit that resisting change and refusing to adapt to 
every change in the environment are essential features of, for example, social 
institutions, but we also admit that institutions often refuse change too much, or for 
bad reasons, and can become outdated or obsolete, how do we decide when an 
institution becomes inert? 
While it is common to think of inertia in individuals or in political systems as an 
accidental feature and a failure of normal adaptational development, I argue that we 
have to see it instead as an unavoidable correlative of the necessary process of self-
maintenance and self-reproduction which allows individuals and institutions to persist 
in a changing world. In order to make this point more clear, I will now describe the 
shift from the primacy of rest to the primacy of change in more detail, both in the 
history of science and in the history of philosophy. 
21 Hartmut Rosa argues that modernity is characterized by ever-increasing speeds of social and 
technological change, and that this acceleration leads to political and personal problems: political systems 
are unable to keep up with rapid changes in the economic sphere, and suffer a consequent loss of 
‘steering’ power; individuals suffer a loss of a stable sense of identity and face an ever-increasing pace of 
life. He also devotes a section of his book to inertia, and admits that social acceleration can be 
accompanied by phenomena of stagnation or slowdown. For Rosa, however, these forms of inertia can 
only be ‘reactive’ or ‘residual’: They either serve to make more acceleration possible, or they are mere 
remnants of old social forms which have not been accelerated yet. ‘Social acceleration represents one, if 
not the, fundamental tendency of modernity. … The process of modernization indeed proves to be a 
ceaseless displacement of the balance between the forces of movement and those of inertia in the favor of 
the former’ (Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity, New York, Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 
304). 
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FROM REST TO CHANGE I: CLASSICAL DYNAMICS AND THERMODYNAMICS 
In Order out of Chaos, Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers describe the transition from 
Newtonian classical dynamics to the new science of thermodynamics which started to 
develop in the nineteenth century. Newtonian physics described a ‘clockwork 
universe’, a stable world characterized by eternal physical laws, which was exemplified 
by the regular revolutions of celestial objects. But the study of heat, pioneered by 
Fourier and Carnot, and spurred on by technological inventions during the industrial 
revolution, revealed that many processes in nature are dissipative and irreversible. 
From the point of view of thermodynamics the model of the universe is not that of a 
mechanical clock, which keeps running indefinitely once set in motion, but that of a 
heat engine which is gradually running out of steam.22 The discovery of the laws of 
thermodynamics certainly marked a great shift in our understanding of nature. It is 
important to realize, however, that within the context of the shift from the primacy of 
rest to the primacy of change, classical dynamics must not be seen simply as an 
affirmation of stability and eternal laws over against the irreversible change of 
thermodynamics. Instead, it was an essential step away from the earlier Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic worldview towards a modern, dynamic view of nature.23 
As noted above, the Copernican revolution dispelled the notion that the earth is at 
rest at the centre of the universe. This discovery had two major consequences. Firstly, 
it put into question the central place of the earth, and by extension humanity, in the 
cosmological order: slowly, people came to realize that the earth is not the privileged 
place of God’s creation, but just another clump of matter in deep, dark space. 
Secondly, the earth could no longer serve as a fixed point of reference relative to 
which motion and rest could be defined. This set in motion a process by which such 
fixed points of reference were progressively eliminated: from the sun at the centre of 
the solar system, to Newton’s concept of ‘absolute space’ defined by the stars which he 
considered to be fixed, to the very notion that time and space themselves are fixed and 
reliable frames of reference. 
From the nineteenth century onwards, the scientific study of heat and the 
behaviour of gasses and fluids completely changed the Newtonian view of the universe. 
It led to the conclusion that in all natural processes energy is irreversibly lost; that 
therefore time is not reversible, but has a definite direction; and that the universe is not 
22 Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos, p. 111. 
23 Besides physics and chemistry, on which I focus here, many other sciences contributed to this shift. 
Geology and biology played a crucial role: Geology by establishing the age of the earth and the fact that 
mountains, continents and oceans are constantly created and destroyed, and biology by demonstrating 
that species do not form an immutable order but develop and become extinct in time. 
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an eternally stable ‘clockwork’, but is characterized by a necessary increase of disorder 
or ‘entropy’.24 
The impulse towards the formulation of the laws of thermodynamics was given by 
Carnot’s work on the maximum efficiency of heat engines, such as the steam engines 
which powered the industrial revolution. Further work by Clausius and William 
Thomson (Lord Kelvin) demonstrated that, in the process of converting differences in 
heat into work, energy in the form of heat is irreversibly lost. By generalizing this 
principle, Kelvin came to the conclusion that there is a ‘universal tendency toward the 
degradation of mechanical energy.’ This law, which has become famous as the second 
law of thermodynamics, was formalized by Clausius and defined in terms of the 
concept of entropy: ‘The entropy in the world tends towards a maximum state.’25 
The concept of entropy has become commonly associated with the idea that there 
is a natural tendency towards disorder in the universe, and has been much used and 
abused in popular discourse as well as in philosophy. But entropy has a very specific 
meaning in thermodynamics, and we should be careful not to illegitimately or 
metaphorically extend it to other fields. Entropy is a measure used to express the 
second law of thermodynamics, which holds that any isolated system (i.e. a system 
which exchanges no energy with the outside) spontaneously evolves towards 
thermodynamical equilibrium, a state in which no measureable change occurs and thermal, 
mechanical, radiative and chemical potentials have reached their maximally stable 
state. Another way of saying this is that, in an isolated system, entropy always increases, 
which means that (as long as no energy is put into or taken out of the system), 
differences within the system (for example differences in temperature, or of the 
distribution of molecules) tend to be reduced. The second law of thermodynamics thus 
implies that within any given system, or between systems which are connected, there is 
a tendency to a ‘levelling off’ of differences such that the system is increasingly less 
capable of producing work. While the total amount of energy is conserved, the 
distribution of energy in any system tends to become more homogeneous.26 
The second law of thermodynamics shows not only that in all natural processes 
energy in a ‘usable’ (that is, highly concentrated or differentiated) state is invariably 
lost through friction and heat exchange, but also that isolated systems - systems that do 
24 It must be noted that the identification of entropy with disorder is problematic, for a number of reasons 
which cannot be explained here in detail. For more information, see Peter Atkins, The Laws of 
Thermodynamics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 52. 
25 Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos, p. 113-115. 
26 For a more extensive explanation of the second law of thermodynamics and entropy see Prigogine and 
Stengers, Order out of Chaos; Atkins, The Laws of Thermodynamics; Herbert B. Callen, Thermodynamics and an 
Introduction to Thermostatistics, New York, Wiley, 1985. 
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not gain energy from the outside - spontaneously tend towards a maximally 
homogeneous state. Its discovery radically undermined the Newtonian image of a 
stable and eternal universe, and reinforced the idea that change is natural while rest is 
an exception: if thermodynamic systems (including organic systems, such as humans, 
as well as planets and stars) naturally tend to run out of energy and crumble away into 
indifference, their fragile existence can only be maintained through a constant input of 
energy and the existence of processes which resist the natural decay of the system. 
FROM REST TO CHANGE II: CRITIQUE, GENEALOGY, DECONSTRUCTION 
The development towards a greater emphasis on change, dynamic processes and 
instability in science is paralleled by developments in philosophy. Analogously to the 
distinction between rest and change, philosophy itself can be divided into two 
theoretical tendencies. The first is what we could call positive philosophy: the positing or 
putting forward of theses about reality, the attempt to say what reality is like. Aristotle 
is perhaps the best example of this kind of philosophy, and his form of questioning - 
‘What is time?’ ‘What are the basic principles of reality?’ etc. - its typical method. The 
second we could call, following Kant and Hegel, critical philosophy: most broadly 
construed, it consists of the critical ‘destruction’ of the concepts posited by positive 
philosophy, and especially, after Kant, of the critical analysis of the very possibility of 
positing true concepts, that is to say, the investigation into the methods and limits of 
our reason. 
In the two centuries since Kant, despite various counter-movements, philosophy 
has increasingly identified itself with its ‘critical’ pole. This goes especially for the 
continental tradition, where the notion of critique – of reason, morality, society, 
power; of metaphysics, onto-theology, logocentrism, colonialism, gender – has become 
the dominant form of philosophical thought. But analytic philosophy, too, contains a 
strong ‘critical’ tendency, evidenced especially in the focus on language and logic and 
in various forms of ‘quietism’. Attempts at a positive description of reality have either 
been left to the sciences, or, in the antiscientific and antirationalist strands of 
continental philosophy, descending from Heidegger, have been declared dangerous or 
deceptive altogether. 
Besides Kant, let me mention three exemplary (but by no means exhaustive) 
moments in the history of critical philosophy: Nietzsche’s notion of genealogy; the 
Marxist and Frankfurt school critique of Enlightenment rationality, perhaps best 
exemplified in Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment; and Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’. Nietzsche combined a critique of conventional morality and 
metaphysical principles. He pioneered the idea that what we believe to be true or right 
is the result of an ‘active forgetfulness,’ a wilful repression of the historical origin of 
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these beliefs, and that bringing this origin to light can show us what they really are: 
truths, mere metaphors, and morality, the result of struggles for social power.27 The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment has a wonderfully subtle double thrust: on the one hand, it 
criticizes the Enlightenment ideal of reason, arguing that its deployment has led to 
social domination and a perverse form of technological rationality. On the other hand, 
it also tries to show the positive potentials inherent in Enlightenment principles, 
potentials which, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, have thus far been inhibited 
by capitalist techniques of social control.28 Derrida’s notion of deconstruction, with 
roots in Heidegger and countless branches in American social theory, is perhaps most 
succinctly expressed in his Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.29 
According to Derrida, a ‘structure’ (this can presumably be a structure of meaning, 
concepts or discourse as well as a social, political or economic structure) is ‘organized’ 
and ‘fixed’ through reference to a ‘centre,’ a master-concept or element relative to 
which all other elements in the structure can be defined. Such a centre (of which the 
concept of ‘God’ is the prime example in the history of Western thought) serves to 
‘limit … the play of the structure’: it gives the structure coherence and stability, thereby 
serving to prevent the ‘anxiety’ which limitless play, change or difference would 
provoke.30 But modern philosophy - for Derrida, the big names are Nietzsche, Freud, 
Heidegger - has given rise to a ‘decentring’ movement: reflection on the nature of 
‘structurality’ shows that the centre is not fixed, but that it can only fulfil its organizing 
function if it is itself put into play, if it is subjected to the changes and contingencies of 
the structure.31 What has become known as deconstruction consists of the application 
of this theory to specific authors, texts or concepts: it shows that a concept or principle 
which we took to be fixed, true and regulative with regards to a specific domain of 
meaning is in fact relative, derivative or contingent. 
What Nietzsche, Critical Theory and Derrida share is the notion that thought 
diagnoses illegitimately fixed, ‘ossified’ or inert concepts or structures, and by doing so 
27 For Nietzsche's writings on active forgetfulness, the relation between concepts and objects and truths 
and metaphors see ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, Penguin Books, 1977. For his writings on history and morality see On the Genealogy of Morals and 
Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann, London, Vintage Books, 1969. 
28 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2007. 
29 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, in Writing and 
Difference, London, Routledge, 2001. Derrida was notoriously reluctant to define deconstruction. The term 
is first mentioned in Of Grammatology, but I find ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ a useful introduction into many 
of Derrida's main ideas. 
30 Ibid., p. 352. 
31 Ibid., p. 354. 
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brings to light the essential historicity, contingency or relativity of concepts or things 
which we thought to be fixed and eternal. Philosophy calls into question dogmatic 
‘truths’, stable identities or oppressive social structures, and thereby helps overcome 
them.32 
We can see, therefore, how modern philosophy, in conjunction with science (as 
well as a wider range of social, political, economical and technological developments), 
has contributed to the shift towards the primacy of change which I have discussed 
above. French philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze, and the various 
forms of ‘post-modernism’ they helped inspire, were especially influential in this 
development. The philosophies of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ attacked an older 
tradition, seen to be dominated by a misplaced emphasis on identity, truth and a 
metaphysical understanding of rationality. They criticized not just specific 
philosophical theorems, dogmatic beliefs or social institutions, but the very idea of 
universal rationality and the ability to make grounded normative claims; not just 
specific truth-claims and identities, but the idea of truth and identity in general. 
Derrida, for example, does seem to claim that all structures are subject to a necessary 
‘decentering’. But if it is possible to show that all truths are historical, all identities 
constituted by difference and all political structures the result of a violent imposition, 
how do we explain the fact that stable identities and social structures nonetheless exist 
and persist? When change is taken to be the natural historical and social condition, as 
it is for much of recent philosophy, the question becomes: how do conceptual and 
social structures reproduce and perpetuate themselves? How do they resist pressures to 
change and maintain themselves in existence? This is where the question of inertia 
becomes crucial, since it asks: How can relatively stable structures persist under 
conditions of a continuous dispersal? 
The philosophies of difference and the various movements of social critique were 
reactions to the dogmatism, authoritarianism and inertia, real or perceived, of the 
society and the philosophical tradition which they confronted. But it is hard to avoid 
the sense that the scales have tipped too far in the other direction, and that the 
dominance of the critical or de(con)structive tendency in continental philosophy has 
given rise to pernicious effects. The frustration with and reaction against this 
dominance can be seen in the renewed interest in materialism, universalism and 
realism in a number of popular philosophical movements, such as speculative realism 
and accelerationism. Two problems in particular which are relevant to the issue of 
inertia could be highlighted. Firstly, overemphasising the critical function of 
32 This is especially true of critical theory - Nietzsche and Derrida are much more agnostic with regards to 
the aim or social efficacy of philosophy. 
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philosophy and social theory leads to a neglect of its positive function. Even if change, 
contingency and historicity needed to be given a more prominent role in the way we 
think about reality, this should not blind us to the fact that identity, objectivity and 
stable social structures are necessary preconditions both for thought and social life. To 
avoid getting stuck in an endless criticism of existing structures and descending into 
irrelevance, critical self-reflection should be balanced by the attempt to actually 
describe and shape these structures. Secondly, this neglect of positive theory can lead 
critical philosophy to an overinflated image of its own power. Critical theory 
sometimes sees itself as a form of social therapy on a psychoanalytic model: it ‘treats’ 
society by theoretically ‘working through’ its pathological contradictions, as if bringing 
social conflicts or pathologies to consciousness is enough to get rid of them. As Deleuze 
and Guattari put it, however, nothing has ever died of contradictions.33 If it is true, as 
the critical model suggests, that social structures perpetuate themselves in the face of 
change, and survive by actively resisting this change, social theorists may well theorize 
in vain. Social structures maintain themselves with a real force; therefore, real force is 
needed to dislodge them. 
The emphasis on the critical side of philosophy, which shows how concepts, 
ideologies or social structures are inherently contingent and historical or exclusive and 
violent, fails to account for the positive aspect of these structures. It fails to account, on 
the one hand, for really existing inertia – for what Hannah Arendt calls ‘the curious 
and sometimes even weird longevity of obsolete bodies politic’34 – and, on the other 
hand, for the positive and necessary role that stable, self-perpetuating and self-
maintaining structures and institutions play in providing society with a sense of 
continuity, identity and legitimacy. A more balanced view of social-historical 
development would therefore have to take into account both the positive and negative 
aspects of inertia and resistance to change. In particular, it would have to account for 
the fact that the very same structures, ideas and institutions which at one point in time 
may be necessary, legitimate or effective may become illegitimate, inert and obsolete at 
a later moment. 
CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of inertia should not be seen in isolation as a particular problem for 
psychologists or professional ‘change managers’. I have offered an outline for a 
unifying account of inertia, understood as irrational or undesirable resistance to 
33 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark 
Seem, and Helen Lane, Penguin Classics, 1983, p. 151. 
34 Arendt, On Revolution, 107. 
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change, in individuals, social structures and the development of knowledge. As I have 
pointed out, similar concerns underlie questions about resistance to change in various 
academic disciplines, such as psychology, economics, political theory and international 
relations and philosophy. These various fields of investigation would benefit from a 
cross-disciplinary approach to the question of change and resistance to change at the 
different levels I have described. 
The relation between inertia, resistance to change and the reasonable self-
preservation of social structures remains to be worked out in more detail. Identifying 
inertia with resistance to change is problematic, because the perpetuation of obsolete 
ideas or social structures need not necessarily take the shape of an active process of 
resistance. Often, the status quo is preserved precisely because of a lack of action or 
reflection, because prevailing habits, ideas and hierarchies are not called into question 
but accepted as inescapable or self-evident. Conversely, not all instances of resistance 
to change constitute inertia. As I have argued, resistance to change is necessary to 
allow stable personal identities, social structures and conceptual frameworks to exist in 
a changing world. People and institutions perpetuate and maintain themselves in 
existence through a variety of more or less active, more or less automated processes of 
selection, rejection or resistance of and to changes in the environment. Part of what I 
have argued here is that these two aspects – self-maintenance necessary for the survival 
of identities and institutions, and irrational inertia – cannot be strictly separated, since 
what is necessary and rational from one perspective may be irrational from another, 
and what is useful or legitimate at one point in time may be obsolete and inert at 
another. This normative aspect of the notion of inertia remains to be explored. In 
particular disciplines such as psychology or organizational studies this question is often 
side-stepped: individuals are inert when their reluctance to change causes them 
difficulties in the way they are integrated in their social environment, and 
organizations are inert when their resistance to change causes them to be inefficient or 
fail to turn a profit. But on a more general level, such as the development of political 
and social institutions which cannot easily be subsumed under a larger framework that 
determines their rationality or irrationality, or the question of the development of 
ideas, knowledge and science, what constitutes ‘irrational’ resistance to change, or if 
such a thing could even be defined, remains an open question. 
Finally, as I have argued here, this question can only be considered from within a 
broader perspective on social-historical change and its relation to material processes as 
well as the development of ideas and knowledge. Arguably, philosophy has been too 
concerned with critiquing ossified, obsolete or dogmatic ideas and social practices, and 
has lost sight of the positive dimension of resistance to change and the self-preservation 
of social and ideational structures, as well as the dynamic nature of their development 
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and decay. In order to criticize obsolete ideas or self-perpetuating systems of power, 
we have to understand the historical processes which lead to their formation, their 
legitimization and delegitimization, and how institutions and ideas which were once 
effective or adequate can become entrenched and inert. 
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